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CORPORATION FINANCE AND BULL MARKETS:
WALL STREET UNDER OATH*
October 24, 1939.
B OoK reviews are never dated. This one is, because I cannot
dissociate from my mind the memory that ten years ago
today, the newspapers first flashed the news of the crash in
securities prices. The public soon realized that the crash was
catastrophic. It marked the end of the bull market of 1929,
and the beginning of a depression from which we have not
emerged. But the newspapers are now heralding news of
soaring securities prices. Are the bulls coming out of their
Wall Street lairs? Will they deliver us from the depression?
Who knows? But history has its tales to tell.
I.
In January, 1935, Governor Lehman appointed Ferdinand
Pecora Justice of the Supreme Court of New York. In thefall of that year, he was overwhelmingly elected to continue
in his judicial post for a term of fourteen years. A grateful
electorate thus gave recognition to the superlative achieve-
ments of the former counsel to the United States Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency. He has now taken
time out to write the absorbing story spread over the 12,000-
page printed record of the testimony taken by the Senate
Committee in 1933-1934.
The Senate Committee functioned as an investigatory
body. Its primary concern was to diagnose the causes of the
financial debacle, and to formulate a curative and preventive
program. Persons occupying positions of highest importance
and responsibility in financial institutions were called to give
testimony.
* WALL STREET UNDER OATH. By Ferdinand Pecora. New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1939, pp. xi, 311.
EDITOR'S NoTE: This article was originally submitted as a book review, but
because of the timeliness of the book and subject it has been printed as a
leading article.
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II.
J. P. Morgan was among the first to testify. Concededly,
his was the greatest private banking firm. Under its articles
of copartnership, the firm consisted of twenty partners. Dif-
ferences or disputes among them were subject to Morgan's
final decisions. He could dissolve the partnership at any
time. His valuation of a partner's interest was conclusive.
At the end of each year, half of the profits was credited to the
individual accounts of the partners; the other half remained
as undivided profits, subject to distribution at Morgan's dis-
cretion. Closely affiliated with J. P. Morgan and Company
were three other banking houses: Drexel & Company of
Philadelphia, Morgan Grenfell & Company of London, and
Morgan et Cie. of Paris. These affiliates facilitated the na-
tional and international business of the parent company.
The latter conducted a bank deposit and an investment
banking business. Its depositors were carefully selected.
Individual depositors held positions of trust as officers and
directors of well-known banks, and the Company accommo-
dated them with personal loans. Corporate depositors in-
cluded the giant railroad, communication, utility, oil and
motor corporations. At the end of 1927, deposits exceeded
half a billion dollars, and even at the end of 1932 (a depres-
sion year), deposits exceeded 340 million dollars. Deposits
were subject wholly to the disposition of the partners of the
firm, who, as private bankers, were free from governmental
regulation, examination or supervision. 1
Its investment business was very extensive. Between
January 1, 1919 and May, 1933, the Company, generally in
association with other bankers, offered to the public more
than six billion dollars of new securities.' Until 1929, the
Company operated on conservative lines, but in that year, it
entered the promotional field, and launched the United Cor-
poration (a utility holding corporation), the Alleghany Cor-
poration (a railroad holding corporation), and Standard
Brands, Inc. (a merger of large food corporations).3 The
'Id. at 15.
2Id. at 18.
3 "The process of concentrating wealth, of creating greater and greater
corporations, of combining into new and gigantic units organizations already
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Morgan Company acquired option warrants at a dollar each,
convertible into United Corporation shares at *27.50. Not
long thereafter, the shares rose to a high of 70, and the
option warrants rose to $17.4 Morgan tradition precluded a
public offering of the common shares of the corporations
which the Company had launched. Such tradition, however,
did not preclude a private offering of the shares to a select
list of purchasers. "Preferred lists" included ex-President
Coolidge, General Pershing, Colonel Lindbergh, Senator Mc-
Adoo (a member of the Senate Investigating Committee),
William Woodin (Secretary of the Treasury at the time of
the investigation), and other persons of influence.
The Morgan Company could see nothing improper in
such practices. The Morgan letter sent to persons on the pre-
ferred lists contained an offer to sell them shares, at cost to
the Morgan Company, although the market price of the shares
was almost double the offering price. The Morgan Company
nevertheless refused to concede that it had favored such per-
sons.5 J. P. Morgan had a profound belief "in the invincible
very large in their own right, was proceeding at a fast pace, and J. P. Morgan
and Company was leading the procession." Id. at 26.
4 Id. at 24.
5 George Whitney, a Morgan partner, speaking of persons on the preferred
lists, testified: "They take a risk of profit; they take a risk of loss."
See letter addressed to William Woodin, later Secretary of Treasury:
"J. P. Morgan and Company,
"February 1, 1929
"My dear Mr. Woodin:
"You may have seen in the paper that we recently made a public
offering of $35,000,000 Alleghany Corporation 15-year collateral trust
convertible 5 per cent bonds, which went very well.
"In this connection the Guaranty Company . . . also sold privately,
some of the common stock at $24 a share.
"We have kept for our own investment some of the common stock
at a cost of $20 a share, and although we are making no offering of this
stock, as it is not the class of security we wish to offer publicly, we are
asking some of our close friends if they would like some of this stock at
the same price it is costing us, namely, $20 a share.
"I believe that the stock is selling in the market around $35 to $37 a
share, which means very little, except that people wish to speculate.
"We are reserving for you 1,000 shares at $20 a share, if you would
like to have it.
"There are no strings tied to this stock, so you can sell it whenever
you wish * * * We just want you to know that we were thinking of you
in this connection and thought you might like to have a little of the stock
at the same price we are paying for it * * *.
"Hoping you are having a pleasant trip, and with best regards,
"Sincerely yours,
William Ewing."
Id. at 29.
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rectitude of his own regime". He "was the undisputed and
absolute, though benevolent, monarch of his realm." 6
III.
The blackest days of the depression came late in Febru-
ary and early in March of 1933. Moratorium legislation and
"bank holidays" were the emergency palliatives of those days.
A defeated President made a sad and quiet exit from the
White House. His successor summoned the nation to battle
against the depression. President Roosevelt's first "war mea-
sure" was the compulsory closing of every bank whose doors
were still open. No bank was to reopen until it established
its liquidity.
The National City Bank, founded in 1812, was one of the
largest banks in the world. Only a few days before it closed
pursuant to presidential proclamation, Charles E. Mitchell,
Chairman of its Board of Directors, testified before the Sen-
ate Committee. "He was an impressive figure, forceful, self-
confident and persuasive. He was then about fifty-six years
old, a self-made man in the American tradition, raised to the
financial heights by his innate capacity and will, and a domi-
nant and attractive personality." 7 He had joined the Na-
tional City organization in 1916, and had risen rapidly to a
position of leadership. Until the crash of 1929, his slogan had
been "expansion to the limit," and a public, avid to invest,8
had hung on his every word. A chastened public now heard
the story of the ramified growth of his organization.
For a century, the National City Bank had carried on
the business usual and customary for commercial banks. But
in 1911, it conceived the idea of forming a banking affiliate,
and caused the incorporation of the National City Company
in New York.9 The Company's charter authorized every vari-
6od. at 6, 7.
7 Id. at 71.
8 "The public * * * were determined that every piece of paper would be
worth tomorrow twice what it was today." Testimony of Otto H. Kahn, of
Kuhn, Loeb & Company. Id. at 52.
9 Frederick W. Lehmann, then United States Solicitor General, recognized
immediately that the formation of the National City Company was an attempt
to circumvent the National Banking Act, and to avoid its regulations and
restrictions. Notwithstanding his expression of this view in an opinion rendered
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ety of business activity except banking and railroading. The
Bank and the Company, while legally distinct and separate
corporations, were factually integral, and practically identi-
cal. The Company's capital of $10,000,000 came from a 40%
Bank dividend, which the shareholders had consented to
transfer to the Company. Pursuant to a voting trust agree-
ment, the shares of the Company were issued to three voting
trustees, 10 and the Bank's shareholders became the owners
of Company trust certificates. A shareholder could not, how-
ever, sell his Bank shares without at the same time selling his
Company trust certificates. The two instruments, printed on
both sides of the same sheet of paper, were legally and physi-
cally inseparable. The management of the Bank and of the
Company was practically identical. In 1929, Mitchell was
Board Chairman of the Bank and of the Company. The Bank
had seventy-five branches in Greater New York, and many
branches all -over the world. The Company had sixty-nine
branch offices in at least fifty-eight cities. Under Mitchell's
direction, the National City organization sold yearly a mini-
mum of a billion dollars of securities, and sometimes as much
as two billions. For the ten years preceding the Senate
investigation, the sales aggregated at least twenty billion
dollars. The National City organization "manufactured"
these securities (Mitchell's phrase), or participated in their
manufacture. Under his leadership, "the National City grew
to be not merely a bank in the old-fashioned sense, but essen-
tially a factory for the manufacture of stocks and bonds, a
wholesaler and retailer for their sale, and a stock speculator
and gambler participating in some of the most notorious
pcols of 'the wild bull markets of 1929. ,"' Before the Senate
Committee, Mr. Mitchell assumed a lofty moral tone, even
though the transactions in respect to which he testified were
subject to severe criticism. I select a few examples for con-
sideration.
by Lehmann to the Department of Justice, the National City Company and
similar banking affiliates vent unmolested. Id. at 80.
1oJames Stillman, Sr., then Chairman of the National City Bank; Frank
A. Vanderlip, then President of the Bank; and Stephen S. Palmer, then a
director of the Bank.
- Id. at 76.
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Edgar D. Brown.
In 1927, Edgar D. Brown, a resident of Pottsville, Penn-
sylvania, owned $100,000-75,000 in cash, and $25,000 in
United States government bonds. His health was not good,
and he was planning a trip to the coast. When he testified
before the Senate Committee in 1933, his wealth was gone,
his health was broken, and he was earning a pittance as clerk
of Pottsville's Poor Board. The change had come about in
the following way: In 1927, he read a magazine advertise-
ment suggesting that if the reader was planning a lengthy
trip, it would pay him to get in touch with the National City
Bank, which would closely guide him in his investments.
The advertisement was signed by the National City Bank.
He answered the advertisement, and a representative of the
National City Company soon called to see him. He had im-
plicit confidence in its representative, because he believed
tlat he was dealing with the largest and soundest bank in the
country. He imposed the single condition that his funds be
invested in bonds, with fixed interest returns. The Company's
expert advised him that his investment in the United States
government bonds was "all wrong". Soon, these bonds were
sold, and instead, the Company invested his funds in Vien-
nese, German, Greek, Peruvian, Chilean, Rhenish, Hunga-
rian, and Irish government bonds, as well as in bonds of
private American corporations. High-pressure salesmanship
was then applied, and he was inveigled into borrowing
$150,000 in order to have his bond investments total a quar-
ter of a million dollars. Later, when the value of these bonds
declined, Brown complained to the National City Company,
only to be told that the fault was his, because he had insisted
upon investment in bonds. The Company now suggested that
he buy stocks. His confidence in National City was still
undiminished, and he authorized the suggested substitution,
without specifying the nature or character of the shares to be
purchased. Violent trading in stocks on his account ensued,
and Brown was steadily losing money. He complained again,
and his portfolio was changed to shares of the National City
Bank and Anaconda Copper, in both of which the Company
was then trading heavily. The value of his shares continued
[ VOL. 14
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to decline. On October 4, 1929, he went to the Los Angeles
branch of the National City Bank, and "asked them to sell
out everything." What ensued is best told in the words of
the record:
"Mr. Brown: I was placed in the category of the man
who seeks to put his own mother out of his house. I was
surrounded at once by all the salesmen in the place, and made
to linow that that was a very, very foolish thing to do.
"Mr. Pecora: That is, to sell your stocks?
"Mr. Brown: Especially to sell the National City Bank
stocks. * * * I then received an unsolicited wire from their
agent in the East *** (reading) 'National City Bank now
525. Sit tight.'"
The crash came a few weeks later. Brown was sold out,
and most of his capital was impaired. He tried to borrow
money from the bank in which he had had implicit faith, but
he was told that a loan was impossible unless he had "assured
earning power and could pay off the loan within six months."
He had no such earning power. He was forty years old,
tubercular, almost totally deaf, with a wife and family depen-
dent upon him for support.12 He had been "wiped out". Mr.
Mitchell expressed "retroactive distaste" for such practices.
Minas Geraes Bonds.
Mitchell testified that the Company had made every
effort to find "safe and proper" securities issues. The Com-
pany's marketing of Minas Geraes bonds in 1928 and 1929
failed to substantiate his claim. Hardly anyone knew what
or where Minas Geraes was. But the National City Company
knew. It knew that prior to 1928, Minas Geraes, one of the
states of the Republic of Brazil, had obtained French loans,
that it had defaulted in payment, and that a suit by the bond-
holders had been brought against it. The Company had in its
files a report from its expert on South American finances
sent in 1927 to the Company's Vice-president in charge of its
foreign bond department, declaring that "the laxness of the
State authorities (of Minas Geraes) bordered on the fan-
tastic. * * * It would be hard to find anywhere a sadder
confession of inefficiency and ineptitude than that displayed
2d. at 84.
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by the various State officials on the several occasions." 13
Notwithstanding this report, the Company introduced into
United States markets an issue of $8,500,000 Minas Geraes
bonds in 1928, and an additional issue of $8,000,000 in 1929.
The report of the expert was no obstacle in the preparation
of a prospectus for the bonds. In fact, the same expert pre-
pared the prospectus, and in it he advised the investor that
"Prudent and careful administration of the States' finances
has been axiomatic with the successive administrations in
Minas Geraes." 14 These bonds were sold by the Company at
$97.50 and $87. At the time of the Senate investigation they
had fallen to about $21. Bankers and selling houses had made
a profit of approximately $600,000. Investors had lost ap-
proximately $13,000,000.
National City Bank Stock.
For many years, the shares of the National City Bank
were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. But in Janu-
ary, 1928, the officers of the Bank professed to have discov-
ered manipulative practices in the trading of the stock on
the Exchange. They considered these practices "distinctly
disadvantageous and probably at times * * * even * * * dan-
gerous", and they caused the stock to be stricken from the
Exchange. The shares were then selling at $785 per share,
with a par value of $100. Salesmen of the Company, stimu-
lated by special premiums, were then put to work. Some
days, they sold as many as 40,000 shares; they even sold
shares short, and the Company borrowed 30,000 shares from
Mitchell's private holdings to cover the short sales.15 In
June, 1928, the shares sold at $940; in January, 1929, at
$1,450; a few months later, after a five-to-one split-up, at
$585 ($2,925 on the pre-split-up basis). After the crash, the
shares fell from $585 to $21. In the three-and-a-half-year
13 Id. at 97.
34 Id. at 98. A person connected with the National City organization ques-
tioned the above-quoted language of the prospectus as possibly "subject to
criticism." The Company conceded (?) the validity of the criticism, and
changed the word "axiomatic" to "characteristic" 1
15 "Greed and irresponsible banking could go no further." Pecora's com-
ment. Id. at 112.
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period ending December 31, 1930, the Company sold almost
2,000,000 shares.
A penitent Mitchell declared before the Senate Commit-
tee: "I would not do it again." 16
IV.
In 1930, the Chase National Bank effected a merger with
the Equitable Trust Company, and became the largest bank
in the world. For many years, Albert H. Wiggin had been its
president and chairman of its Board of Directors. He had
joined the Bank in 1904, and had achieved the reputation of
being the most popular banker in Wall Street. But in con-
sequence of the merger in 1930, control of the Bank passed to
the Rockefellers, and Winthrop W. Aldridge, brother-in-law
of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., became its president. Wiggin
remained its active head, with the title of Chairman of the
Governing Board, until his resignation in December, 1932.
He testified before the Senate Committee late in 1933. His
answers were "terse, .succinct and directly to the point, with
seldom an unnecessary word". He was "calm, shrewd and
cynical" and "most decidedly a die-hard." 17 His testimony
quickly deflated his popularity.
While the National City Bank had its National City
Company, the Chase Bank had its five affiliates, chief among
them being the Chase Securities Corporation, organized in
1917. In addition, Wiggin had his six private corporations,
controlled by his immediate family; three of them were Cana-
dian corporations, organized to reduce or avoid income taxes.
During the depression years, Wiggin, in reporting to the
shareholders of the Bank, denounced high wages, and de-
clared that American business "may reasonably ask labor to
accept a moderate reduction in wages." Wiggin, however,
did not always practice what he preached. As head of the
Chase National Bank, his salary in 1928 was 175,000; in
1929, an equal amount; in 1930, $218,750; in 1931, $250,000.
But in 1932 he did accept "a moderate reduction in wages".
He received only $220,300; less than the 1931 "wage", but
16 Ibid.
17 Id. at 136.
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more than the 1928, 1929 and 1930 "wage"! These figures
represent Wiggin's regular salary as head of the Bank; he
also received large sums as bonus. The presidency of the
Bank was just a part-time job for Wiggin. In addition, he
held fifty-nine directorships, and was a member of finance
and executive committees of many corporations. For such
services, he received, for example, from the Brooklyn-Man-
hattan Transit Corporation a salary of 20,000; from Armour
and Company, $40,000; from the American Express Com-
pany, $30,000; from Western Union, $2,000. Many of these
corporations procured loans from the Chase National Bank,
but Wiggin denied that decisions on loan applications were
in any way influenced by his associations with the corpora-
tions. In 1928, when his salary as head of the Bank was
$175,000, and his bonus was $100,000 (a total of $275,000),
his real income, added to that of the private corporations
which he controlled, was more than $6,800,000, on which
federal income taxes of approximately 962,000 were paid.
Between September, 1927 and July, 1931, the Chase Se-
curities Corporation, directly or indirectly, participated in
and financed pools in bank stock. During the five-year period
1928-1932, trading in bank stock brought the Bank's invest-
ment affiliate a profit of $159,000. During substantially the
same period, trading in the same stock brought Wiggin and
his private corporations a cash profit of more than $10,425,-
000. Over 4,000,000 of this profit was realized between
September 19, 1929 and December 11, 1929. During that
period, he was a member of the "Bankers' Consortium",
formed to stabilize the market as far as possible. The Bank,
through its affiliates, was participating in a pool to stabilize
the market. But Wiggin was selling Chase Bank stock short.
Five thousand of the shares which he -sold short were sold
directly to the pool. To finance these transactions, Wiggin
and his corporations borrowed more than $8,000,000 from the
Bank.
Upon his resignation as chairman of the Governing
Board of the Bank in December, 1932, Wiggin was granted a
pension of $100,000 annually. After his deflation by the Sen-
ate Committee in 1933, public disapproval become so over-
whelming as to impel Wiggin to renounce his pension. "In
[ VOL. 14
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the entire investigation," says Justice Pecora, "it is doubtful
if there was another instance of a corporate executive who
so thoroughly and successfully used his official and fiduciary
position for private profit." 18
V.
The New York Stock Exchange was a "scarlet thread"
ever winding its way through the Senate investigation. An
unincorporated association of 1,375 members, it operated
very much as a club, subject only to self-discipline, and to no
external regulation. To its president, Richard E. Whitney,
it was a "perfect institution".10 To Wiggin, it was "a God-
given market".20
When questioned before the Senate Committee, Wall
Street financiers affected a naive innocence of familiarity
with Exchange practices. Mitchell and Wiggin were wholly
unfamiliar with pools. Arthur W. Cutten, famous in specu-
lative finance, could not define a "wash sale". Buttenweiser,
of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, knew of "pegging" only from
hearsay. 21 But the Senate Committee found that in 1929,
pools, syndicates, joint accounts and the like, were operating
in 105 stocks listed on the Exchange. "The public who bought
these stocks at dizzily mounting prices did not do so merely
because of impersonal economic forces; they were the victims
of a determined, organized group of market-wise operators,
armed with special information and special facilities, and
backed generously with banker's credits". 22
VI.
The testimony before the Senate Committee "had brought
to light a shocking corruption in our banking system, a wide-
spread repudiation of old-fashioned standards of honesty and
fair dealing in the creation and sale of securities, and a
merciless exploitation of the vicious possibilities of intricate
's Id. at 161.
19 Id. at 259.
20 Id. at 262.
21 Id. at 261.
22 Id. at 263.
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corporate chicanery." 28 Enormous sums of money had been
lost by unwary investors who had purchased worthless securi-
ties.2 4 State regulation had proved ineffective. The Senate
Committee set about to prepare a program of federal legis-
lative reform which culminated in the enactment of four
statutes.
The Banking Act of 1933 required the separation of the
commercial banks from their security affiliates. 25 A director
or officer of a bank was forbidden to serve as officer of an
investment house. Private bankers, such as J. P. Morgan &
Co., were required to choose between their bank deposit and
underwriting business.
Then the Securities Act of 1933,2 6 the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,27 and the Public Utility Act of 1935 28
were enacted. I have analyzed these Acts elsewhere, 29 and I
shall therefore consider them here very briefly. The primary
purpose of the Securities Act of 1933, popularly known as
the Truth in Securities Act, is to provide for a full and fair
disclosure of the facts concerning securities issued for sale by
means of interstate instrumentalities or the mails. Disclo-
sure is effected by a registration statement filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and a similarly regis-
tered prospectus delivered to the purchaser.
The essential purposes of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are (1) to regulate securities exchanges and markets,
(2) to control credit, (3) to prevent unfair practices and
(4) to regulate corporations with listed securities by requir-
ing periodical reports, controlling proxies, and also, to a
limited extent, directors, officers and principal shareholders.
The Public Utility Act of 1935 provides for the elimina-
tion of unnecessary public utility holding companies, and for
23 Id. at 283.
24 The losses sustained by the investing public through the sale of fraudu-
lent securities in the United States was estimated in 1933 to have been twenty-
five billion dollars for the ten years preceding. Legis. (1933) 33 CoL. L.
REV. 1220.
25 48 STAT. 184 (1933), 12 U. S. C. §24-7 (1934).
2648 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §77a (1934).
27 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. § 78a (1934).
2849 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. §79 (Supp. 1938).
29 PRASHNER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PIVATE CORPORATIONS (1937)
611, 619, 1198.
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the regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
of the remaining companies.
Before and after the enactment of these statutes, dire
prophecies were made of their probable consequences. On
the whole, these prophecies have proved false. It is true that
immediately after the enactment of the Securities Act of
1933, the flotation of new securities declined, but this was
due to the fear of promoters and underwriters to risk the
truth. The investing public had become less gullible.
VII.
Gone from the seats of the mighty are the old titans of
Wall Street. J. P. Morgan still rules, but thanks to the
Banking Act of 1933, only half of a partitioned kingdom.
Mitchell, the super-banker and stock salesman, was displaced.
Wiggin, the most popular banker in Wall Street, has with-
drawn. Richard E. Whitney, the Stock Exchange moralist
and spokesman, was convicted on his own confession for mis-
applying clients' and Stock Exchange funds. History has its
tales to tell.
Twenty-five years ago, James Harvey Robinson devel-
oped the thesis that we study the past in order to understand
the present, and that present conditions and opinions can be
understood only by following carefully the processes which
produced them.3 0 The people of the United States should
never forget the processes which produced the current federal
securities legislation. So long as they remember and under-
stand, they will firmly resolve not to permit it to be effaced
or emasculated. Such resolve will be an enduring tribute to
the work of Justice Pecora, who has now made available in
book form, Counsel's Summation of the Testimony.
Louis PRASHKIER.
St. John's University School of Law.
30 RoBINsoN, THE NEw HISTORY (1913) 24.
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